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I. INTRODUCTION
THIS article provides a brief historical explanation of the role thatjuries have played in Anglo-American civil trial practice. In doingso, the article documents the rise and fall of jury trial practice as a
mechanism for resolving civil disputes in both England and America. The
article explains how the modern rules of procedure and procedural stat-
utes promote resolving disputes through pretrial litigation procedures at
the expense of resolving disputes by jury trial.
The article begins with a description of the use of juries in England at
the end of the twelfth century and continues until the near disappearance
of juries in civil cases in England in the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury. The article continues with the adoption and interpretation of the
Seventh Amendment in America by the First Congress and a description
* Chief Justice John and Lena Hickman Distinguished Faculty Fellow and Professor
of Law, Dedman School of Law, Southern Methodist University.
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of developments in American states, and it ends with the transformation
of civil trial practice into modern litigation. The article makes a predic-
tion that the American trial practice will continue to follow England’s
lead, moving further away from resolving civil disputes by jury trials.
In England and its colonies, before and after independence from the
British Empire in 1776, civil and criminal cases were adjudicated by jury
trials, and a jury was a traditional “English right.” This right was regarded
as a safeguard of the public’s civil and political liberties on a par with the
right to vote and representative government.
But as explained below, by the end of the twentieth century, jury trial
practice in civil cases in England was abolished by statute in most cases.1
Similarly, despite the adoption of the Seventh Amendment to the Consti-
tution in America and of a constitutional right to jury trial by every
American state, except Louisiana,2 by the twenty-first century, the use of
jury trials to resolve civil disputes in America had declined, and jury trials
had largely vanished.3
II. THE TRADITIONAL RELATIONSHIP OF THE PLEADING
AND TRIAL STAGES OF CIVIL TRIAL PRACTICE
Beginning around the end of the twelfth century, for most of its long
history, civil trial practice in jury cases in England and in state and federal
courts in America generally began, and still begins today, with a pleading
stage during which the parties exchanged pleadings and alleged their
claims and defenses. For centuries, the pleading stage was followed by the
trial stage during which the jury rendered its verdict. During parts of this
period, the common law system of “issue pleading” was used by the par-
ties in the common law courts (Common Pleas, King’s Bench, and Ex-
chequer) in England. Issue pleading was designed to define the judicial
controversy until the exchange of pleadings produced a single issue of law
or fact, without providing for the disclosure or discovery of witnesses,
documents, or other evidence before trial.4
By contrast, alongside this “single-issue” pleading practice, a plea
called the “general issue” could often be used to put the entire case at
issue and to avoid all of the later pleadings.5 Separate forms of general
1. See infra Part III.
2. Usner v. Strobach, 591 So. 2d 713, 721 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (“There is no United
States or Louisiana constitutional right to a trial by jury in a civil case in a Louisiana court;
this right is provided for by statute.”) (emphasis omitted) (citing LA. CODE CIV. PROC.
ANN. arts. 1731–1814 (1983)).
3. See DENNIS HALE, THE JURY IN AMERICA: TRIUMPH AND DECLINE 327–65 (2016);
see also Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters
in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 460, 462–63 (2004); see also
infra Part X.
4. See J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 76–79 (4th ed.
2002).
5. See HENRY JOHN STEPHEN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN
CIVIL ACTIONS: COMPRISING A SUMMARY VIEW OF THE WHOLE PROCEEDINGS IN A SUIT
AT LAW 168–70 (3d ed. 1882).
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issue pleas could be pleaded for separate forms of action: “for trespass
[battery] or case [negligence], not guilty; for debt on simple contract, nil
debet; for assumpsit, non assumpsit; and so on.”6
Neither form of common law pleading practice provided the parties
with fair notice of the facts of the claims and defenses that would be
presented to a jury at trial.7
In the early nineteenth century, Parliament adopted the New Pleading
Rules of Hilary Term. The “Hilary Rules” drastically restricted the availa-
bility of the general issue form, resulting in an unfortunate return to spe-
cial pleading practice, despite its flaws, much to the dissatisfaction of the
English legal profession.8 As a result, the common law pleading system
was ultimately replaced by the Judicature Acts of 1873–1875. In general
terms, these Acts required the plaintiff to plead a claim, “stating briefly
the facts on which he relied and what relief he claimed. The defendant
was then to make a brief statement of his defence [sic] . . . , provided that
he did not merely deny generally all the facts in the statement of claim.”9
By the later twentieth century, rules of court became subject to “regu-
lar revision by the judges.”10 This ultimately resulted in a recognition of
the importance of the pre-trial phase of litigation for the conduct of pre-
trial discovery and for preservation of evidence.11 Similarly, in the United
States, dissatisfaction with common law pleading practices led to the de-
velopment of a system of “fact pleading” generally identified as the
“Field Code,” which was adopted in New York in 1848.12 According to
Dean Charles Clark, by 1875, twenty-four American states had adopted
this system, and by the 1930s, most American States had done so.13
III. DEMISE OF CIVIL JURY TRIAL PRACTICE IN ENGLAND
The use of juries to decide civil cases began in England around the end
of the twelfth century. As civil jury trial practice developed, issues raised
by the pleadings were determined by the presentation of evidence and
argument during the trial stage of a jury trial. Juries consisted of twelve or
more men from the vicinity of where the matter in question occurred.
Thus, in a trespass action in which the defendant pleaded “[n]ot guilty—a
writ of venire facias was sent to the sheriff commanding him to cause
6. FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFRY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 4.4 (3d ed.
1985) (discussing the answer and reply).
7. See John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122
YALE L.J. 522, 532–53 (2012) (“In American civil procedure before the Federal Rules,
‘trial was often the only real way to do discovery . . . .”) (quoting Stephen C. Yeazell,
Getting What We Asked for, Getting What We Paid for, and Not Liking What We Got: The
Vanishing Civil Trial, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 943, 951 (2004)).
8. See J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 88–90 (4th ed.
2002).
9. See id. at 91.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 93–95.
12. See CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 21–24 (2d
ed. 1947).
13. See id. at 22–24.
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twelve men of the neighbourhood, unrelated to the parties, to come
before the court to ‘make recognition’: that is, to enquire into the matter
and state the truth therein.”14
At first, these men based their verdict on their own private knowl-
edge.15 By the late fourteenth century, the parties commonly used wit-
nesses to testify at trial.16 As late as 1670, in the famous Bushell’s Case,
the court ruled that juries could bring their knowledge to bear on a deci-
sion, even when testimonial evidence was also presented in court.17 “But
less than one hundred years later, jurors were prohibited from bringing
personal knowledge to bear on their decisions.”18
Until 1854, the jury was the prescribed method of trying cases in the
common law courts.19 As explained in the next section of this paper, the
Common Law Procedure Act of 1854 allowed the parties, by consent, the
option to have trial judges conduct bench trials.
By the middle of the twentieth century, the English civil jury trial had
virtually disappeared. Jury trials are available only in a handful of civil
cases today.20
Lord Patrick Devlin’s monograph21 describes the method of trying civil
cases to juries before its virtual abandonment in England. With certain
exceptions, this method very strongly resembled the methods used today
in conventional trials in American courts.22 Devlin’s monograph also
summarized the decline and demise of jury trials in civil cases in England
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
• 1854, Common Law Procedure Act. For centuries, trial by jury was
the only form of trial used in any common law action in the King’s
courts. But in 1854, the enactment of the Common Law Procedure
Act provided that trial by judge alone could be had by consent of
both parties. The same Act empowered the trial judge to refer mat-
ters of account for determination by a judge or referee in such
cases.23
• 1873, Judicature Act. As a result of the enactment of the 1873 Judi-
cature Act, which also enacted complete fusion of law and equity
14. See J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 72–73 (4th ed.
2002).
15. See JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE
COMMON LAW 47–49 (1898).
16. See id. at 102.
17. See ELLEN E. SWARD, THE DECLINE OF THE CIVIL JURY 75 (2001).
18. Id. at 75.
19. See PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 130–31 (1966).
20. See Conor Hanly, The Decline of Civil Jury Trial in Nineteenth-Century England,
26 J. LEGAL HIST. 253, 253 (2005); see also James Driscoll, The Decline of the English Jury,
17 AM. BUS. L. J. 99, 107 n.58 (1979) (noting that civil jury trials were still available in
England at the end of the twentieth century for cases of “fraud, libel, slander, malicious
prosecution and false imprisonment” but that English courts could deny a jury trial in these
actions).
21. See generally PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY (1966).
22. See id. at 116–21.
23. Id. at 130.
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for actions in the King’s courts, so-called “prolonged examination
cases” could be referred to a referee for “matters requiring pro-
longed examination of documents or accounts or any scientific or
local investigation.”24
• 1883 (R.S.C. Ord. 36). In 1883, in “libel, slander, malicious prosecu-
tion, false imprisonment, seduction and breach of promise of mar-
riage” cases, “trial by jury continued to be obtainable as a matter of
course, but in all other cases it had to be specially asked for. . . .
Later, the procedure was tightened by requiring the application for
a jury to be made within a fixed time limit.”25
• 1918, Juries Act. “In 1918, the right to jury was abolished except in
seven cases, . . . the six cases previously enumerated together with
cases of fraud; in all other cases trial by jury was made discretion-
ary.” This “emergency legislation [was] designed to expire six
months after the end of the war, but when it did expire, it was re-
placed by another Act [(Administration of Justice Act), which was]
intended to be permanent.” As explained by Lord Devlin, toward
the end of the Great War of 1914–1918, “jurors were no longer eas-
ily available.”26
• 1920, Administration of Justice Act. In 1920, the Administration of
Justice Act replaced the Juries Act of 1918. The Administration of
Justice Act made the provisions of the 1918 Juries Act permanent.
Lord Devlin explains that “[a]s a permanent alteration [widespread
abolition of jury trials in most civil cases] was not well received;
indeed, it was critici[z]ed so severely that in 1925 Parliament” re-
versed course and restored the right to jury trial as an option in all
cases if “specially asked for” by a party.27
• 1925, Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act. “[I]n 1925,
Parliament restored the status quo ante 1918. But the restoration
was not long lived.”28
• 1933, Administration of Justice Act. “In 1933, as part of a drive for
cheaper litigation, Parliament substantially re-enacted the 1920
[Administration of Justice] Act,” which curtailed the use of juries in
civil cases, with the exception of cases of libel, slander, malicious
prosecution, false imprisonment, seduction, the breach of the prom-
ise of marriage, and fraud. Lord Devlin explains that the chief alter-
ation made by the 1933 Act was “that the right to a jury in cases of
fraud was granted only to the party charged.”29 In other cases, the
Administration of Justice Act of 1933 granted trial judges discretion
to grant jury trials under a rule of civil procedure.30
24. Id.
25. Id. at 130–31.




30. See id. at 130 n.5 (citing R.C.S., Ord. 36, r.1).
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• Ward v. James, All ER 563. Until the Court of Appeal’s 1965 deci-
sion in Ward v. James, the trial court’s discretion was regarded as
more or less unfettered.31 But in Ward v. James,32 the Court of Ap-
peal decided that absent “extraordinary circumstances,” personal
injury cases should be decided by judges without the existence of a
jury. Lord Denning (Master of the Rolls) reasoned that having
judges rather than jurors assess damages improved the uniformity
and predictability of damage awards.33 Subsequent decisions usu-
ally followed the same analysis.
• The Supreme Court Act of 1981. Ultimately the Supreme Court
Act of 1981 “permits a right to jury trial only in cases of defama-
tion, malicious prosecution, fraud, and false imprisonment.”34
Lord Devlin’s history strongly suggests that the effects of the First
World War (1914– 1918) “provided a good ground for at least a tempo-
rary change [in civil trial practice] . . . and the war of 1939–1945 com-
pleted the debacle.”35 Other scholars have suggested that “the steady
decline in the use of the civil jury across the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries resulted from the choices of litigants and their lawyers, who
chose not to use it.”36
IV. PRE-1787 DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN
JURY SYSTEM
“It is difficult to overstate the support for the jury system, both crimi-
nal and civil, among eighteenth-century Americans. Along with the prin-
ciple of representation in the legislature, juries were understood [by these
Americans] to be an essential part of any free government.”37
Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, civil jury trials were wide-
spread. By 1778, ten of the thirteen colonies had adopted new colonial
constitutions in response to a resolution adopted by the delegates to the
Continental Congress urging the colonies to write new constitutions in
contemplation of dissolving the connection with Great Britain.38 “Most of
the new constitutions included specific guarantees of jury trials in crimi-
nal cases, . . . [but] only six of the new state constitutions specifically
protected the right to a jury trial in civil cases: Georgia, Massachusetts,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland.”39
31. See, e.g., Hennell v. Ranaboldo [1963] 3 All ER 684 at 684 (Eng.) (“There is no
doubt that the matter is completely in the discretion of the judge.”).
32. Ward v. James [1965] 1 All ER 563 at 568–70 (Eng.).
33. See Ward, 1 All ER 563 at 563, 572–574.
34. Conor Hanly, The Decline of Jury Trial in Nineteenth-Century England, 26 J. LE-
GAL HIST. 253, 278 n.189 (2006).
35. See DELVIN, supra note 19, at 131–32.
36. See JOHN H. LANGBIEN, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 464 (2009); see also Hanly, supra note 34, at 278.
37. DENNIS HALE, THE JURY IN AMERICA: TRIUMPH AND DECLINE 60 (2016).
38. See id. at 66.
39. See id. at 67–68.
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The jury system was itself regarded as a “powerful obstacle to tyr-
anny.”40 As explained by Professor Dennis Hale:
[The jury] was an institution in which ordinary citizens could stand
against judges, prosecutors, and even the monarch himself, refusing
to convict a subject either unfairly charged or charged with behavior
(criticizing officials, for example) that jurors believed should not be
considered a crime among free men. The jury could perform this ser-
vice because of its right to bring in a “general verdict,” conflating
judgment on the evidence and judgment on the law into one complex
result, the separate parts of which could not be isolated for
inspection.41
For a time, the power of jurors to decide the law and to disregard the
court’s instructions was widely accepted.42 This power of jurors to decide
the law did not last, however. Ultimately, “by the 1820[s], the jury’s
power over law had all but disappeared.”43
V. THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION IN 1787
At the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, the subject of the right to jury
trial in civil cases was not even raised by anyone until shortly before the
scheduled adjournment of the Convention.44 At that point, a group of
delegates (known to us as the antifederalists) raised the absence of a Bill
of Rights in the proposed Constitution “by an objection that the docu-
ment under consideration lacked a specific guarantee of jury trial in civil
cases.”45
Five days before the Convention was to adjourn, Hugh Williamson, a
North Carolina delegate, raised the objection “to the lack of guarantee of
a civil jury trial.”46 By this time in the process, however, the delegates
concluded that it was too late and too hot in the summer of 1787 in Phila-
delphia to draft a Bill of Rights.47 As explained by Professor Wolfram:
In the end, the [federalist] defenders of the proposed constitution
were reduced almost entirely to defending the omission of a guaran-
tee of jury trial as a [drafting problem that] . . . would be disposed of
by appropriate legislation as one of the first items of business of the
new Congress. This assurance was asserted amidst a chorus of feder-
40. See id. at 60.
41. See id.
42. See, e.g., Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1794).
43. See Matthew P. Harrington, The Law-Finding Function of the American Jury, 1999
WIS. L. REV. 377, 377–81 (1999); see also Edith G. Henderson, The Background of the
Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289, 299–300 (1966) (“The elusiveness of the ques-
tion whether juries could ‘decide the law’ [is related to] . . . what used to be called ‘mixed
questions of law and fact’ such as negligence, in which inferences as to the legal effect of
physical facts are often but not always left to the jury.”). For additional coverage of mixed
questions, see infra Part IX.
44. Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57
MINN. L. REV. 639, 657–58 (1973).
45. Id. at 657.
46. Id. at 658–59.
47. Id. at 660–61.
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alist disclaimers of any intent to limit jury trial in civil cases in the
proposed federal courts. . . .
[T]he antifederalists advanced several distinct and specific argu-
ments in favor of civil jury trial: the protection of debtor defendants;
the overturning of the practices of courts of vice-admiralty; the vindi-
cation of the interests of private citizens in litigation with the govern-
ment; and the protection of litigants against overbear-ing and
oppressive judges.48
On September 17, 1787, the Constitution was signed by thirty-nine of
the fifty-five delegates attending the Philadelphia Convention.49 Three
delegates dissented; Thomas Jefferson and John Adams did not sign due
to service abroad as ambassadors to France and Great Britain,
respectively.50
VI. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS
The jury debate about proposed amendments and a Bill of Rights con-
tinued in the state ratifying conventions. “In total, the state ratifying con-
ventions proposed . . . nearly 100 different amendments . . . .”51
Thereafter, on June 8, 1789, Representative James Madison proposed
eight “articles of amendment.”52 Debate on Madison’s proposed amend-
ments was postponed until a draft of the amendments was reported by a
congressional Committee of Eleven (only North Carolina and Rhode Is-
land were not represented) on July 28, 1789.53 On September 25, 1789,
Congress approved twelve articles of amendment and submitted them to
the states for ratification.54 Articles Three through Twelve were ratified
on December 15, 1791, and became Amendments One through Ten of the
Constitution.55
Two of Madison’s proposed amendments concerned the right to jury
trials in civil cases as follows:
That, in article 3d, section 2, . . . [add] these words to wit:
“But no appeal to such court shall be allowed where the value in
controversy shall not amount to ____ dollars; nor shall any fact tria-
ble by jury, according to the course of common law, be otherwise re-
examinable than may consist with the principles of common law.”
. . . [That, in] article III, section 2, . . . [add the following words]:
48. See id. at 666, 670–71.
49. See RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 429–30 (2009).
50. See id. at 363.
51. DENNIS HALE, THE JURY IN AMERICA: TRIUMPH AND DECLINE 84 (2016).
52. See id.
53. See id. at 85.
54. Wolfram, supra note 44, at 725–26.
55. Id. at 725–26.
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“In suits at common law, between man and man, the trial by jury, as
one of the best securities to the rights of the people, ought to remain
inviolate.”56
VII. JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789
The Judiciary Act of 1789 also granted power to juries to try “issues in
fact, in the district courts, in all causes except civil causes of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction.”57 The Judiciary Act also provided: “[T]he trial of
issues in fact in the circuit courts shall, in all suits, except those of equity,
and of admiralty, and maritime jurisdiction, be by jury.”58
VIII. THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE SEVENTH
AMENDMENT
As adopted by Congress in 1789 and ratified by the States in 1791, the
Seventh Amendment states: “In Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in
any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the com-
mon law.”59
In determining whether the Seventh Amendment requires that a jury
be empaneled to decide cases, the federal courts have used a historical
test purportedly based on the practice in English courts in 1791.60 As ex-
plained by Professor Wolfram, this “historical test” extends beyond
whether a jury is required and into the respective roles of judges and
juries, whether the verdict must be unanimous, and whether juries with
less than twelve members are permissible.61 “English practice in 1791 de-
termines all.”62
Although academic focus has concentrated on the existence of the right
to trial by jury under the first (“preservation”) clause of the Seventh
Amendment, the central characteristic of the right to trial by jury is ad-
dressed more directly by the Reexamination Clause. Indeed, in 1830, Jus-
tice Story characterized the Reexamination Clause as “more important”
than the remainder of the Seventh Amendment precisely because it was
then believed to preclude reexamination of jury verdicts under English
procedure in civil damage actions at common law by reviewing courts on
appeal.63 As explained below, despite the fact that the Reexamination
56. Id. at 726–28.
57. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9, 17, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77, 83.
58. Id. at § 12. See also SUJA A. THOMAS, THE MISSING AMERICAN JURY: RESTORING
THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE CRIMINAL, CIVIL, AND GRAND JU-
RIES 112 (2016).
59. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
60. See Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57
MINN. L. REV. 639, 639–640 (1973).
61. See id.
62. See id. at 640; see also Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935).
63. See Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433, 447–48 (1830).
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Clause was initially interpreted to mean what its name still suggests, a
series of Supreme Court cases ultimately changed the meaning of the Re-
examination Clause.
The early cases interpreting the Reexamination Clause settled the con-
cept that the common law mentioned in the Reexamination Clause “is
not the common law of any individual state, . . . but it is the common law
of England” as of 1791.64
The [Seventh Amendment of the] Federal Constitution guarantees the
right to jury trial in civil actions in federal courts, and nearly every state
constitution contains a similar guaranty. . . . They do not extend but pre-
serve the right of jury trial as it existed in English history . . . in 1791 when
the Seventh Amendment was adopted . . . .65
Unfortunately, the scope of reexamination of jury verdicts by review-
ing courts in England in 1791 was not so clear in the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries, as shown by subsequent Supreme Court decisions.
At first, in Parsons v. Bedford, the plaintiff brought an action for debt
for damages against William Parsons in the Parish Court of New Orleans.
The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana. The defendant pleaded a general traverse (nil
debit) coupled with a petition of reconvention (counterclaim). The case
was tried to a jury, which rendered a verdict for the plaintiffs. Bedford
moved for a new trial based on several defenses. The trial court denied
the motion for new trial and rendered judgment on the verdict. On writ
of error, the defendant challenged the jury’s findings.66
Based on the Seventh Amendment’s Reexamination Clause, the Su-
preme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court.67 After explain-
ing that the Reexamination Clause is a “substantial and independent
clause” that is “still more important” than the Preservation Clause, the
Supreme Court reasoned as follows:
This [Reexamination Clause] is a prohibition to the courts of the
United States to re-examine any facts tried by a jury in any other
manner. The only modes known to the common law to re-examine
such facts, are the granting of a new trial by the court where the issue
was tried, or to which the record was properly returnable; or the
award of a venire facias de novo [a remand for a new trial], by an
appellate court, for some error of law which intervened in the
proceedings.68
64. See United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750);
see also Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935) (holding that
the Reexamination Clause “not only preserves that right [to trial by jury] but discloses a
studied purpose to protect it from indirect impairment through possible enlargements of
the power of reexamination existing under the common law”).
65. FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFRY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 8.1 (3d ed.
1985) (discussing the Seventh Amendment).
66. See Parsons, 28 U.S. at 441–42.
67. See id. at 449.
68. See id. at 447–48.
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In 1913, in Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Company, the Supreme
Court held that entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict by the trial
court based on the insufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence violated the
Reexamination Clause of the Seventh Amendment.69 This holding rests
on the Court’s examination of the leading English cases and the Court’s
conclusion that under English law in 1791, “there was nothing in the na-
ture or operation of the demurrer to evidence at common law which has
any tendency to show that issues of fact tried by a jury could be reexam-
ined otherwise than on a new trial.”70
But in 1935, in Redman, the Supreme Court reversed course and ruled
that because a district court had expressly reserved its decision on mo-
tions for judgment as a matter of law made during the trial before the
rendition of the jury’s verdict, the submission of the case to the jury sub-
ject to the reservation technically did not violate the Reexamination
Clause.71
In Redman, the Supreme Court ruled that a similar practice was recog-
nized in 1791 under English common law, and evidentiary review follow-
ing this procedure did not violate the Seventh Amendment’s
Reexamination Clause because at the time the reservation was made
there was no jury verdict to reexamine.72
Less than a decade later, in Galloway v. United States, the Supreme
Court ruled more candidly that the trial court has the power to render
judgment as a matter of law if the evidence presented is legally insuffi-
cient because reasonable minds could not differ on how vital facts would
be determined under the record evidence.73 Even more significantly, in
Galloway, the Supreme Court minimized the importance of English prac-
tice in 1791 as follows:
[T]he passage of time has obscured much of the procedure which
then [1791] may have had more or less definite form, even for histor-
ical purposes.
. . . [T]he Amendment was designed to preserve the basic institution
of jury trial in only its most fundamental elements, not the great
mass of procedural forms and details, varying even then [1791] so
widely among common-law jurisdictions.
Apart from the uncertainty and the variety of conclusion which fol-
lows from an effort at purely historical accuracy, the consequences
flowing from the view asserted [i.e., requiring a new trial rather than
judgment as a matter of law] are sufficient to refute it.74
69. Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 398–99 (1913).
70. Id. at 392.
71. See Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 658–59 (1935).
72. See id. at 659; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b) (substituting a procedural reservation
for the reservation that distinguished Slocum from Redman).
73. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 390–93 (1943).
74. See id.
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The Galloway Court’s “interpretation” of the Seventh Amendment is
difficult to square with the text of the provision.75 Nonetheless, many aca-
demic commentators have approved Galloway’s functional interpretation
of the Seventh Amendment.76 More recently, in Gasperini v. Center for
Humanities, Inc., the Supreme Court also interpreted the Reexamination
Clause in the context of the constitutional ability of federal courts to con-
duct weight of the evidence review of jury findings.77
Gasperini is a diversity case in which Gasperini, who had loaned 300
original slide transparencies to the Center for Humanities, sued the
Center for damages for the loss of the transparencies under various state
law claims, including breach of contract, negligence, and conversion.78
The case was tried to a jury which awarded Gasperini $450,000 in com-
pensatory damages.79 The Center attacked the verdict on a number of
grounds, including excessiveness of the damage award.80 The district
court denied the Center’s motion for a new trial. On appeal, the Second
Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment by holding that the $450,000
verdict “materially deviates from what is reasonable compensation” in
violation of a statutory standard prescribed by a New York statute.81 The
court of appeals set aside the verdict and ordered a new trial unless Gas-
perini agreed to a remittitur to an award of $100,000.82
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of what stan-
dard a federal court must use to evaluate the alleged excessiveness of a
jury verdict based on state law in a diversity case. This question impli-
cated the interpretation of the Seventh Amendment’s Reexamination
Clause in both the federal district court and on appeal.
After explaining that the Seventh Amendment does not preclude fed-
eral district courts from granting new trials if the verdict is against the
weight of the evidence,83 the remaining issue was whether the court of
appeals could review and set aside the district court’s denial of a new trial
on the ground of excessiveness.
A bare majority of the Supreme Court held that neither the Seventh
Amendment nor prudential concerns barred a federal circuit court from
setting aside a jury verdict and granting a new trial if the verdict is against
the weight of the evidence. The Court further held that nothing in the
Seventh Amendment precludes appellate review of a trial judge’s denial
75. See 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2819 (2d ed. 1995); see also Suja A. Thomas, Re-Ex-
amining the Constitutionality of Remittitur Under the Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J.
731, 751–52 (2003).
76. See, e.g., Patrick Woolley, Mass Tort Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Reex-
amination Clause, 83 IOWA L. REV. 499, 504–506 (1998); see also Edward Brunet, Summary
Judgment Is Constitutional, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1625, 1628–31 (2008).
77. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 418–19 (1996).
78. Id. at 419.
79. Id. at 420.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 421.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 433.
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of a motion to set aside a jury verdict as excessive.84 Based primarily on
the conclusion that “[e]very circuit [court] has said that [appellate review
is permitted] . . . if the size of the verdict seems to be too far out of
line,”85 the majority opinion concludes that “appellate review for abuse
of discretion is reconcilable with the Seventh Amendment as a control
necessary and proper to the fair administration of justice . . . .”86 But the
Supreme Court did not allow the court of appeals to exercise the same
discretion as the trial court might exercise in ruling on a motion for new
trial.87 Instead, the Supreme Court held that the Seventh Amendment
restricted but did not prohibit courts of appeals from ruling on whether
the trial court abused its discretion in evaluating the sufficiency of the
evidence because the verdict is excessive.88
In dissent, Justices Scalia and Rehnquist would have held that the Sev-
enth Amendment’s Reexamination Clause precludes review of a district
court’s refusal to set aside a verdict as contrary to the weight of the evi-
dence and prohibits appellate courts from reexamining the district court’s
decision.89 As Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion stated:
I am persuaded that our prior cases were correct that, at common
law, “reexamination” of the facts found by a jury could be under-
taken only by the trial court, and that appellate review was restricted
to writ of error which could challenge the judgment only upon mat-
ters of law. . . . Cases of this Court reaching back into the early 19th
century establish that the Constitution forbids federal appellate
courts to “reexamine” a fact found by the jury at trial . . . .90
As explained by Professor Cassandra B. Robertson:
Scholars have been as divided as the [Supreme] Court itself over the
Court’s decision in Gasperini. Some have agreed with Gasperini’s
conclusion that appellate courts should be allowed to review a trial
court’s ruling on the weight of the evidence, based either on histori-
cal practice or on an argument that the Seventh Amendment should
be given a “dynamic interpretation.”91
84. Id. at 433–36.
85. Id. at 435 (quoting WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 75, § 2820, at 209).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 438.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 458.
90. Id. at 457–58.
91. Cassandra B. Robertson, Judging Jury Verdicts, 83 TUL. L. REV. 157, 192–93
(2008) (citing Woolley, supra note 76, at 510–16). Professor Laurence Tribe has also ex-
plained that: “It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Gasperini Court was led into
error—that it seriously misunderstood the Re-examination Clause and essentially ignored
the Seventh Amendment’s unique focus on the common law history as of the time of the
amendment’s adoption.” 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
§ 3–32, at 629 (3d ed. 2000).
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IX. MODERN EVOLUTION OF JURY TRIAL RIGHTS
Until recently, the American experience with jury trial practice has
been very positive throughout history. Despite some hostility to the adop-
tion of the constitutional right to jury trial in civil cases by the Federalists
in 1787, the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution was approved by
Congress in 1789 and ratified by the states in 1791.
As adopted, the Seventh Amendment contains a Reexamination
Clause which states that judicial reexamination of jury verdicts is prohib-
ited “in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law.”92
Continuing controversy about the meaning of the constitutional right
of trial by jury in civil cases based on the Seventh Amendment and simi-
lar state law standards has evolved so that judicial review of verdicts and
judgments now rests on evolving evidentiary sufficiency standards applied
in federal courts and on similar standards followed in state courts. Ac-
cordingly, the review standards concerning the sufficiency of the evidence
are now the primary safeguards protecting the public’s right to the fair
adjudication of disputes. While these standards are complex and subject
to debate, reinterpretation, and change, they protect against usurpation
by judges and reviewing courts of the public’s right to conventional trials.
Despite the potential vulnerability of jury and bench trial findings under
current standards of review, these standards of review are compatible
with the preservation of verdicts and judgments based on the determina-
tion of mixed questions of law and fact by juries and judges.93
Other factors have more directly affected the decline in the use of con-
ventional trials to resolve disputes, including the multitude of substantive
and procedural changes in the types of disputes that are resolved in court;
the increasing complexity of the substantive law; the availability of alter-
native methods of dispute resolution; and substantive and procedural
changes in the processes of pretrial, trial, and appellate practice that have
developed over the last 80 to 100 years.94
X. TRANSFORMATION OF TRIAL PRACTICE INTO
LITIGATION
In general terms, the mechanisms for resolving civil disputes and the
procedures available and necessary for the resolution of disputes in court
experienced enormous changes during the twentieth century. As a result
of the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 and com-
parable state laws thereafter, a new pretrial practice phase of adjudica-
tion was adopted in state and federal courts in the United States. One
92. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
93. William V. Dorsaneo, III, Reexamining the Right to Trial by Jury, 54 SMU L. REV.
1695, 1698–99 (2001). See supra note 43.
94. See DENNIS HALE, THE JURY IN AMERICA: TRIUMPH AND DECLINE 335–50 (2016);
see also John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE
L.J. 522, 569–72 (2012).
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major consequence of this reform has been the reduction in both the at-
tractiveness and the need for civil trials, and particularly jury trials, to
resolve or to facilitate the resolution of civil disputes in court. Another
consequence that was probably not foreseen by the reformers is the in-
creased time and expense involved in the operation of an increasingly
complex pretrial phase that may facilitate a reasonable settlement or that
may instead increase the cost of litigation so that settlement becomes an
undesired necessity.
Before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pretrial
practice was extremely limited. In particular, pretrial discovery was lim-
ited, both in scope and the procedures available under procedural rules
and statutes.95 In addition, there was no pretrial conference rule, no com-
prehensive pretrial practice procedures other than pleading practice, and
no summary judgment rule. More generally, pretrial practice was con-
trolled by rules governing the parties’ pleadings.
By contrast, modern litigation became the practice of pretrial discovery
and motion practice. By the end of the Twentieth Century, pretrial dis-
covery practice, summary judgment motion practice and other forms of
alternative dispute resolution began to replace the resolution of many
disputes by trials. As a result, conventional trials and particularly jury
trials occurred and continue to occur less and less frequently.96
Civil jury trial practice has also been adversely affected in recent de-
cades by myriad forms of legislation, regulation, and rule-making, gener-
ally described as tort reform. In addition, the widespread use and
enforcement of arbitration clauses, forum selection clauses, and contrac-
tual waivers of even constitutional jury trial rights have contributed to the
demise of jury trials. Finally, successful attacks have been made on civil
juries and jury trial practice by politicians, insurance, and business inter-
ests in the public media. As a result, the use of juries in civil cases has
been diminished greatly and is unlikely to regain prominence in future
cases.
XI. CONCLUSION
As a result of all of these factors, the prognosis for the rejuvenation of
civil jury trials in ordinary cases is poor.97 Jury trials will probably con-
tinue to occur in a small percentage of civil cases that are tried in whole
or in part by trial specialists. Similarly, evidentiary hearings and separate
trials will continue to be conducted in particular types of litigation. But
despite the adoption and proposals for adoption of new procedures de-
signed to facilitate the use of jury and bench trials to resolve disputes, by
95. See Julius F. Franki, Discovery, 13 TEX. B.J. 447, 447–48, 475–76 (1950).
96. See Nathan L. Hecht, The Vanishing Civil Jury Trial: Trends in Texas Courts and
an Uncertain Future, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 163, 172-81 (2005).
97. See Jennifer W. Elrod, Is the Jury Still Out?: A Case for the Continued Viability of
the American Jury, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 303, 323 (2012) (“If you dream of representing a
client in court before a jury, that dream may be vanishing along with the jury trial. . . .
[C]ivil jury trials are becoming the rare exception rather than the rule.”).
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making trials shorter, less expensive, and more efficient,98 even if sub-
stantial improvements are made in the trial process, there is no likelihood
that civil trial practice will again become the central or even a routine
part of a general practitioner’s practice activities. This means that jury
trial practice in America is likely to follow the English pattern for many
reasons, including especially the probable choice of the public and the
legal profession not to use conventional trials to resolve most civil
disputes.
98. See Stephen D. Susman & Thomas M. Melsheimer, Trial by Agreement: How Trial
Lawyers Hold the Key to Improving Jury Trials in Civil Cases, 32 REV. LITIG. 431, 441–66
(2013).
